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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
OSCAR HACKFORD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMIS-
SION OF UTAH, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT 
Case No. 
9330 
On December 31, 19 57, the Plaintiff was em-
ployed as a sheepherder by the Deseret Livestock Com-
pany, and while in the course of his employment a 
team of horses ran away, throwing him to the ground 
and the wheels of a wagon ran over his body and frac-
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tured his spine, and otherwise bruising his body (R. 
1). 
Immediately after the accident he was taken to 
the hospital at Tooele, Utah, and there treated by 
Dr. Johnson. After his release from the hospital, 
about ten weeks later, he was placed under the care 
of the company physician, Dr. A. M. Okelberry, at 
Salt Lake City, where he received further treatment 
until about April, 1959. The employer, being a self-
insurer, paid Plaintiff $100 per month compensation 
during this period. 
In May, 1959, the employer stopped paying 
compensation and Plaintiff, not being able to work, 
requested permission from the Defendant to change 
doctors (R. 5). This request was denied (R. 6), and 
on July 6, a formal, verified application was filed with 
the Defendant praying that it determine his claim and 
award relief (R. 7, 8). On May 16, 1960, a bearing 
was had on this application (R. 24-59). On June 
16, 1960, the Defendant rendered its decision (R. 6 L 
62). On July 7, Plaintiff filed his motion for a re-
hearing (R. 63), which re-hearing was denied (R. 
64). 
From the order denying a re-hearing and the de-
cision of the Commission, Plaintiff obtained a writ of 
review from this Court. 
To reverse the Commission, Plaintiff assign the 
following: 
......................... ~~~-··======~=---------------~ 
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1. Error of the Commission in denying Plain-
tiff the right to change doctors. 
2. Error of the Commission in prejudging the 
merits of this case. 
3. Error of Commissioner W eisley in acting as 
Referee without being appointed by the Commission, 
in writing, so to do. 
4. Error of the Referee in receiving in evidence 
the reports of Dr. A. M. Okelberry. 
5. Error of the Referee in receiving in evidence 
the report of the medical panel. 
6. Error of the Commission in denying Plain-
tiff's motion for a re-hearing. 
7. The decision of the Commission is contrary 
to the evidence. 
8. The decision of the Commission is contrary 
to law. 
9. The award of the Commission is inadequate 
in law. 
To sustain the writ, Plaintiff makes the follow-
ing: 
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POINTS 
I. 
NO PERSON SHALL BE DEPRIVED OF 
LIFE, LIBERTY, OR PROPERTY WITH-
OUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
II. 
THE COMMISSION MAY NOT ACT AR-
BITRARILY OR EX PARTE IN DECIDING 
A COMPENSATION CASE. 
III. 
THE AWARD IS CONTRARY TO THE 
EVIDENCE AND THE LAW. 
IV. 
EQUITY WILL PROVIDE A REMEDY 
WHERE NONE EXIST AT LAW. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
NO PERSON SHALL BE DEPRIVED OF 
LIFE, LIBERTY, OR PROPERTY WITH-
OUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
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U. S. Constitution, Amendment 14 
Utah Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 7 
U tab Code, 19 53, Sec. 3 5-1-31 
The 14th Amendment to the U. S. Constitution 
provides: 
"Nor shall any state deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor deny to any person within its jur-
isdiction the equal protection of the law." 
Article I, Section 7, Utah Constitution, provides: 
"No person shall be deprived of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law." 
For the purpose of administering the Workmen's 
Compensation Act, Section 35-1-31, Utah Code, 
1953, provides: 
''The Commission shall have power to ap-
point, by an order in writing, any member of 
the Commission, or any other competent per-
son who is a resident of this state, as an agent, 
whose duties shall be prescribed in such order, 
for the purpose of making any investigations 
with regard to any employment or place of em-
ployment.'' 
Nowhere in the entire record is there any order 
of the Commission appointing Chairman, Otto A. 
Weisley as Referee to investigate this case and prescrib-
ing his duties therein. The proceedings and hearing 
in this case were conducted by Otto A. Weisley, as 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
Referee (R. 24). The record further shows that all 
other action taken in this case was taken by Otto A. 
Weisley as Chairman. The Commission not having 
appointed Otto A. Weisley as Referee by written order 
and prescribing his duties therein, his actions herein 
are a complete nullity, and the decision of the Com-
mission, based thereon, is a violation of the constitu-
tional provisions cited above. 
II. 
THE COMMISSION MAY NOT ACT AR-
BITRARILY OR EX PARTE IN DECIDING 
A COMPENSATION CASE. 
Utah Code, 1953, Sec. 35-1-77 
Utah Fuel Co. v. Ind. Comm., 194 P. 22 
Spencer v. Comm., 40 P. 2d 188 
Ocean Guarantee Co. v. Ind. Comm., 245 
P. 343 
Pruno v. Comm., 204 N. W. 576 
Mining Co. V. Comm., 240 P. 440 
In Ocean Guarantee Co. v. Comm., (supra), this 
court said: 
''Rules promulgated by the Commission 
must not, of course, deprive the parties of their 
Constitutional ri.ght of having their day in 
court and of havtng the cause determined after 
(not before) an impartial hearing. u 
Pruno v. Ind. Comm., (supra), is a Nebraska 
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case wherein the rule is stated with the following lan-
guage: 
"The Industrial Commission is a quasi-
judicial body, and is supposed to stand as an 
impartial tribunal, and no partisan activity on 
its part towards a claimant is required; its duty 
being to make investigations, find the facts ac-
cording to the weight of evidence, and apply the 
law fairly and justly." 
Mining Co. v. Ind. Comm., (supra), is another 
Utah case wherein this court said: 
''From the language used in the act, 1t 1s 
clear that the Commission has not the power, 
and it was not intended to have the power, to 
dispose of any application for compensation 
pending before it, except upon the merits unless 
the application is dismissed or withdrawn by 
the applicant himself." 
Utah Fuel Company v. Industrial Commission, 
(supra), states: 
"Every administrative body, if it is to 
function at all, must have some power and jur-
isdiction to determine for itself whether or not 
it may proceed in a given case, and this we think 
niay be done without usurping the functions of 
the courts, so long as it does not act arbitrar-
ily., 
In Spencer v. Comm., (supra), this court said at 
page 197: 
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"Whether an employee is totally or per-
manently disabled are ultimate matters to be 
decided by the Commission, as is also the 
amount and time compensation maY be 
awarded upon all the evidence. Upon these 
ultimate questions, expert witnesses may ~ot 
properly express opinions, nor may such opin-
ions relating to loss of bodily functions become 
a measure of compensable functions possessed 
by an employee prior to his injury. 
"A claim for compensation may not be 
denied because a new injury 'lighted up, reop-
ened, or revived an existing infirmity of the in-
jured employee.' " 
Section 3 5-1-7 7, U tab Code, 19 53, provides, 
among other things: 
"If objections to such report are filed it 
shall be the duty of the Commission to set the 
case for hearing within thirty days to determine 
the facts and issues involved * * * Upon 
such hearing the written report of the panel may 
be received in evidence as an exhibit, but shall 
not be considered as evidence in the case except 
insofar as it is sustained by the testimony ad-
mitted.'' 
On June 15, 19 59, Plain tiff wrote the Commis-
sion requesting permission to change doctors (R. 5) . 
The Commission sent a copy of that letter to the em-
ployer and on June 17, 1959, the employer's attorney 
wrote the Commission a letter (R. 4), objecting to the 
change, and pursuant thereto the Commission denied 
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the request (R. 6). On July 6, 1959, Plaintiff filed 
his verified application with the Commission praying 
that his claim be determined by the Commission (R. 
7, 8). A copy of this application, together with some 
type of form, was forwarded to the employer, and 
on July 15, 19 59, the employer's attorney wrote the 
Commission (R. 11, 12), calling its attention to a re-
port of Dr. A. M. Okelberry, ( R. 9, 1 0) , and claim-
ing that the acts of the Plaintiff were responsible for 
his condition, and thereupon, on July 21, 1959, the 
Commission wrote Plaintiff's attorney (S. R. 2), ad-
vising him, among other things: 
HYour allegations that the applicant is 
totally and permanently disabled is entirely 
without foundation in fact or in law." 
Thus, Plaintiff's cause was decided without a 
hearing. 
In reply to the Commission's letter of July 21, 
on July 27, Plaintiff's attorney wrote the Commission 
insisting that a hearing be had (R. 13, 14), and there-
upon, on August 11, 1959, the Commission appointed 
a medical panel to examine Plaintiff (R. 16), and on 
Sept. 21, 19 59, the panel met and, under the influence 
of the Commission Chairman, Otto A. Weisley, ex-
amined the Plaintiff and made its report (R. 17-19). 
This report was not made under oath or the panel 
members sworn in regard thereto. 
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On October 6, 1959, the Commission notified 
Plaintiff of the filing of th~ panel report (S. R. 4), 
and on October 20, 1959, the Plaintiff filed his ob-
jections to the panel report (R. 20). There the mat-
ter rested without anything·whatsoever being done by 
the Commission, and after repeated telephone calls and 
personal visits to the Commission's office, by counsel, 
on February 23, 1960, the Commission wrote Plain-
tiff's attorney a letter (R. 21) in which it said: 
"Your objections to the medical panel re-
port are not well taken. Your client was given 
a thorough examination by a panel of ortho-
pedic specialists. The conclusion could not be 
more definite and certain. The rating is ade-
quate. Your client cannot possibly be rated 
permanently and totally disabled. * * *" 
Here again the Commission decided the merits of 
this case without a hearing and without evidence being 
taken, and in violation of the rule enunciated in the 
above-cited cases and statutes and in violation of due 
process of law. 
III. 
THE AWARD IS CONTRARY TO THE 
EVIDENCE AND THE LAW. 
Utah Constitution, Art I, Sec. 11 
Utah Code, 1953, Sec. 35-1-45 
Utah Code, 1953, Sec. 35-1-67 
Utah Code, 1953, Sec. 35-1-77 
Spencer v. Comm., 40 P. 2nd 188 
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Ocean Guar. Co. v. Comm., 245 P. 343 
Ellis V. Comm., 64 P. 2nd 1303 
Section 3 5-1-4 5 provides: 
"Every employee mentioned in 35-1-35, 
who is injured * * * by accident arising 
out of or in the course of his employment, 
wheresoever such injury occurred, provided the 
same was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be 
entitled to receive, and shall receive, and shall 
be paid, such compensation for loss sustained on 
account of such injury or death, and such 
amount for medical, nurse, and hospital services 
and medicine * * * as herein provided.'' 
Section 3 5-1-6 7, provides: 
"In cases of permanent total disability, the 
award shall be 60 percent of the average weekly 
wages for five years from the date of injury, 
and thereafter 45 percent of such average weekly 
wages, but not to exceed a maximum of $27.50 
per week and not less than $17. 50 per week. 
* * * Where the employee has tentatively 
been found to be permanently and totally dis-
abled, it shall be mandatory that the Industrial 
Commission of U tab refer such employee to the 
division of vocational rehabilitation under the 
board of education for rehabilitation, etc." 
On March 31, 1960, Plaintiff's counsel advised 
the Commission of the provisions of Section 3 5-1-7 7, 
and requested the Commission to grant or deny a hear-
ing (R. 22); thereupon the Commission set the hear-
ing for May 16, 1960 (R. 23). There is no showing 
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in the record to justify this prolonged delay and there-
fore Article I. Section 1 L Utah Constitution was vio-
lated by unnecessary delay. 
On June 16, 1960, the Commission rendered its 
decision (R. 61), based upon the reports of Dr. A. 
M. Okelberry, which reports were forwarded to it by 
the employer prior to the hearing, (see Point II). The 
Plaintiff was not furnished with copies of these reports 
or notified of their being filed with the Commission. 
They were not introduced in evidence at the hearing 
and the Plaintiff, nor his attorney, had no knowledge 
of them, whatsoever, until they were discovered in the 
record on file herein after receipt thereof from the 
Clerk of this Court. Citation of authority should not 
be necessary to hold that the consideration of these re-
ports by the Commission is reversible error. 
The report of the medical panel was received in 
evidence without a foundation being laid therefor and 
over the objection of Plaintiff (R. 50, 51). 
The rules of evidence require the party relying 
on certain evidence to introduce it in evidence. The 
employer's counsel was present at the hearing (R. 24), 
but he did not introduce this report in evidence. The 
Referee, being an impartial arbiter, (supposedly), had 
no right to introduce it. Section 35-1-77 expressly 
provides that such report, 
''shall not be considered as evidence in the case 
except insofar as it is sustained by the testimony 
admitted.'' 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
There is no evidence in the entire record that says 
anything about the qualifications of the members of 
the panel or their authority to practice their professions 
in Utah, and the Referee erred in receiving the same in 
evidence and basing his decisions thereon. 
The Plaintiff testified in his own behalf (R. 42-
51), the substance of which is that he has not been able 
to work since the date of the accident. His testimony 
is corroborated by three other lay witnesses (R. 52-
59), none of which are contradicted anywhere in the 
record; assuming, but not admitting, that the reports 
of all the doctors were properly admitted in evidence, 
they don't claim that Plaintiff was able to work. All 
they say is that he has a 15/'o loss of bodily function. 
Dr. Stobbe testified (R. 32): 
Q. "In your opinion, is Mr. Hackford 
able to work? Do any kind of labor?" 
A. "I don't think he's physically fit for 
any physical job." 
On cross-examination (R. 34), 
Q. "When you say, 'take for granted', 
what do you mean by that? You make an as-
sumption that may or may not be true, is that 
right?'' 
A. "When you have a degenerative pro-
cess existing, I would not be in a position to say 
when it got started. But, with a history of be-
ing run over by a wagon, when anything of 
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that kind * * * even if it were present 
before * * * it would certainly be ag-
gravated by the injury. By the accident." 
Dr~ Hugh Wayman testified on behalf of Plaintiff 
(R. 35-41); he found a misalignment of the spine and 
that condition was existing on the date of the hearing, 
and at (R. 40), he said: 
"The accident you speak of could cause 
this misalignment.'' 
Nowhere in the entire record is this testimony 
disputed, and yet the Commission refused to consider 
it (R. 61). 
In Spencer v. Commission, this Court said: 
"The Commission may not, without cause 
or reason, arbitrarily or capriciously refuse to 
believe and to act upon creditable evidence 
which is unquestioned and undisputed." 
In Ellis v. Commission, this Court said: 
"A chiropractor may treat injured work-
men in this state, and under the Workmen's 
Compensation Act of this state, they are en-
titled to be paid for their services the same as 
any other doctor . ., 
The Spencer case is directly applicable here and 
expressly holds that bodily function is not the basis 
upon which compensation is awarded in Utah, but the 
ability to work is the criterion and this must be de-
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termined by the Commission (not experts) , from all 
the evidence. 
Section 3 5-1-4 5 provides for medical, hospital, 
nursing care and medicine. Section 3 5-1-6 7 provides 
for. compensation as such. The Plaintiff was earning 
$250 per month at the time of the injury (R. 1), and 
at the time of the decision, had been unable to work 
for 128 ·weeks, and under the provisions of these stat-
utes, he was entitled to 128 weeks' compensation at 
the rate of $3 7.50 per week, or $4800, less any 
amount paid by the employer, plus medical expenses 
and rehabilitation cost, and as yet, no effort has been 
made by the Commission to rehabilitate Plaintiff. 
There is no evidence in the record even indicating 
that Plaintiff is recovered from the injury sufficiently 
to work or to indicate when he will be able to work, 
and for this reason the Commission had no authority 
to arbitrarily fix his compensation at $35.00 per week 
for thirty weeks (R. 62), all of which denied Plaintiff 
the equal protection of law guaranteed by the consti-
tution. 
IV. 
EQUITY WILL PROVIDE A REMEDY 
WHERE NONE EXIST AT LAW. 
Lamken V. Miller~ 44 Pac. 2nd 190 
Mirror Co. v. L. A. County, 44 Pac. 2nd 
547 
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School District v. Pirie, 46 Pac. 2nd 10 5 
R. R. Co. v. Bouvier, 62 A. 868 
Theis v. Spokane Co., 74 Pac. 1004 
Alexander v. Hillman, 75 F. 2nd 451 
"Where remedy at law is clearly inade-
quate, equity will intervene.tt Lamken V. Mil-
ler, supra. 
·'Equity does not wait upon precedent 
which actually squares with the facts in contro-
versy, but will exert itself in those situations 
when right and justice would be defeated but 
for its intervention." Mirror Co. v. Los An-
geles County, supra. 
·'Equity meets all conditions for human 
ingenuity, and human affairs cannot create con-
ditions which the long arm of Equity Courts 
cannot reach if injustice or wrong would other-
wise result." School District v. Pirie, supra. 
·'Equity is a better sort of justice which 
corrects legal injustice, where the latter errors 
through being expressed in a universal form, 
not taking account of particular cases." Rail-
road Co. v. Bouvier, supra. 
"A court of equity will never aid in the 
perpetuation of a fraud simply because appli-
cation is made in e~~ty form of law. Its pow-
~rs are not so superftctal or ~o restricted. Equity 
ts, we are told, the correctton of that wherein 
the law, by reason of its universality, is defi-
cient." Theis v. Spokane Co., supra. 
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HCourts of equity may suit proceedings and 
remedies to circumstances of cases and formulate 
them appropriately to safeguard, conveniently 
to adjudge and promptly to enforce substantial 
rights of all parties before them." Alexander v. 
Hillman, supra. 
We have pointed out in this brief wherein the 
Commission had made up its mind on the merits of 
this case long before the hearing was held on May 16, 
1960, and the arbitrary award made by the Commis-
sion in total disregard of the statutes and evidence is 
further evidence of that prejudice and by reason of 
which the Commission is disqualified to act in this 
case. There is no provision in the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act for a change of Venue in the event of 
the disqualification of the Commission, and in this 
we respectfully submit that this Court, in the exercise 
of its equity powers, provide an impartial arbiter for 
the Plaintiff in this cause. 
CONCLUSION 
We have pinpointed the unfairness and partiality 
of the Commission in handling this case: we have 
shown wherein it has acted capriciously and arbitrar-
ily in denying the Plaintiff the compensation and 
relief to which he is entitled under the statutes, and 
we have pointed out the lack of any provision in the 
statutes for a change of Venue whenever the Commis-
sion is disqualified to act, and in this we respectfully 
submit that this court, in the exercise of its equity 
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powers, set aside the award made by the Commission 
and award Plaintiff the relief to which he is entitled 
under the statute or in the alternative direct the Com-
mission· to make such a ward and for such other and 
further relief as to this Court seems just and equitable 
in the premises. 
Respectfully submitted, 
D. H. OLIVER, 
Attorney for Plaintiff. 
138 South 2nd East, 
Salt Lake City II, Utah. 
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